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Abstract
A group of players in a cooperative game are partners (e.g., as in the form of
a union or a joint ownership) if the prospects for cooperation are restricted such
that cooperation with players outside the partnership requires the accept of all
the partners. The formation of such partnerships through binding aggrements
may change the game implying that players could have incentives to manipulate
a game by forming or dissolving partnerships. The present paper seeks to explore
the existence of allocation rules that are immune to this type of manipulation. An
allocation rule that distributes the worth of the grand coalition among players, is
called partnership formation-proof if it ensures that it is never jointly profitable
for any group of players to form a partnership and partnership dissolution-proof
if no group can ever profit from dissolving a partnership. The paper provides
results on the existence of such allocation rules for general classes of games as
well as more specific results concerning well known allocation rules.
∗Special thanks are due to Peter Holch Knudsen and Mich Tvede for valuable input at the early
stages of this work. We also thank Philippe Solal for comments. Of course, all deficiencies remain the
responsibility of the authors.
†Correspondence: Lars Peter Østerdal, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster
Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark. Email: lars.p.osterdal@econ.ku.dk.
Tel: +45 35323561, Fax: +45 35323000.
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1 Introduction
A problem common to societies, clubs, joint venture organizations, and other formal
social structures is how to allocate the benefit, or cost, of a joint activity among the
contributing members. In the language of cooperative game theory we can describe such
a problem in the following stylized way. There is a set of players and each coalition of
players has a worth. This worth can be thought of as the income or surplus that the
coalition can obtain without cooperating with the other players, or it can be thought
of as a claim on total income. The problem is then to find an allocation rule that
specifies how total income (i.e., the worth of the grand coalition) is distributed among
the players for any configuration of the coalitional worths.
The present paper is concerned with the players’ incentives to create binding agree-
ments — called partnerships — in such cooperative game situations. If a group of players
create a partnership, they commit to not cooperate with players outside the partnership
without the accept of the rest of the group. We may think of such partnerships as if
every player in the group is given veto power over activities involving any member of
the partnership. The remaining players outside the partnership are also aﬀected; these
outside players are deprived of the possibility of collaborating with any strict subset of
the players in the partnership.
Examples of partnerships include members of a parliament joined in political parties
or particular parties in a coalition government, a couple getting married, countries
forming a union (e.g., a trade union or a political union), workers or groups of workers
forming a labor union, partners within a firm, or firms establishing joint ownerships
over a common pool of assets.
The creation of a partnership may change the game and hence the outcome of any
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allocation process. Thus the creation or dissolution of a partnership can be seen as a
way of changing the cooperative game situation, whether it is due to players seeking
to manipulate the game or due to a modelling choice by the analyst. In any case,
for someone deciding on an allocation rule to be implemented in a cooperative game
situation, knowledge on whether a specific allocation rule gives players incentives to
manipulate the game by forming or dissolving partnerships could be highly relevant.
Particularly it may be of special interest to consider allocation rules that are “immune”
to such manipulation, or at least to be aware of if such rules exist at all.
We shall call an allocation rule partnership formation-proof if it is never strictly
profitable for any coalition of players to form a partnership when applying the allocation
rule and partnership dissolution-proof if it is never strictly profitable to dissolve a
partnership. Thus, implementing a partnership formation-proof allocation rule implies
that no manipulation in the form of players forming partnerships will occur while a
partnership dissolution-proof allocation rule will be immune to manipulation in the
form of players dissolving partnerships. The present paper explores whether allocation
rules exist that are in this way immune to manipulation while still satisfying some
desirable properties for allocation rules.
Manipulation of cooperative games has been studied by numerous papers starting
with, e.g., Postlewaite and Rosenthal (1974), Charnes and Littlechild (1975), Hart and
Kurz (1983), Kalai and Samet (1987), Legros (1987), Lehrer (1988), and Hart and
Moore (1990). The present paper is closely related to this literature, however, there are
also some important diﬀerences. In Postlewaite and Rosenthal (1974), Legros (1987),
Lehrer (1988), and more recently Haviv (1995), Derks and Tijs (2000), and Knudsen and
Østerdal (2008) groups of players can amalgamate into a single player.1 The present pa-
per follows Haller (1994), Carreras (1996) and Segal (2003) and considers environments
where the set of players is fixed but the worth of coalitions can be manipulated.
Haller (1994) focuses on bilateral agreements (i.e. agreements between two players),
1Postlewaite and Rosenthal (1974) and Legros (1987) follow Aumann (1973) and refer to a group
of players amalgamating into a single player as a syndicate. Charnes and Littlechild (1975) call it a
union.
3
and considers so-called proxy- and association-agreements. In a proxy-agreement one
of the players becomes a null player, while the other player’s marginal contribution
to a coalition is set equal to the two players’ joint marginal contribution.2 In an
association-agreement, if one of the players enter a coalition, it contributes as if both
players entered. Carreras (1996) considers partnerships as defined in the present paper
and uses the Shapley value to discuss the eﬀect of partnership formation in (especially)
simple games.3 Segal (2003) contains a general taxonomy of types of integration.
In contrast to e.g. the proxy- and association-agreements discussed by Haller (1994)
the creation of partnerships does not yield any technical eﬃciency gains as a partnership
does not increase the worth of any coalition as long as the game is monotonic; it only
reduces the worth of coalitions containing some but not all members of the partnership.
On the other hand, there is a dual eﬀect of creating a partnership: Players outside
the partnership cannot obtain the full worth from cooperation with strict subsets of
players in the partnership. The purpose of forming a partnership should therefore be
to reduce the power of outside players without reducing the power of players in the
partnership equally. However, it is generally not clear which of the aforementioned
eﬀects dominates.
Section 2 introduces the model and basic definitions. In section 3 some results on
the existence of partnership formation- and dissolution-proof allocation rules are given
for several general classes of cooperative games. We find that the equal-split rule is the
only symmetric allocation rule that is both partnership formation-proof and partnership
dissolution-proof. Further, while no symmetric partnership formation-proof allocation
rule exists that satisfies the null player condition we find that on the class of monotonic
games4 there do exist symmetric partnership dissolution-proof allocation rules satisfying
the null player condition. In section 4 we restrict attention to convex games and consider
some well-known allocation rules with favorable properties on this class of games. We
2Haller (1994, Section 6.4) discusses the similarities and diﬀerences between proxy-agreements and
amalgamations.
3See also Carreras et al. (2005), Carreras et al. (2009).
4Monotonic games hold the property that no player contributes negatively to a coalition.
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find that while a symmetric probabilistic allocation rule, such as the Shapley value,
is partnership dissolution-proof on the class of convex games5 other well-known core
allocation rules are neither partnership formation- nor dissolution-proof.
In section 5 we address the influence of the definition of stability on the results
presented in section 3 and 4.
In section 6 we explore the situation where several disjoint partnerships exist within
a population and consider whether more players could be expected to join a partnership
or if players have incentives to dissolve existing partnerships and possibly create new
ones. A few results on the stability of partnership structures are provided. We comment
on the consequence of applying diﬀerent definitions of stability in this context. Section
7 concludes.
2 Partnerships: model and definitions
A cooperative game with side-payments is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, .., n} is a finite
set of players with |N | = n ≥ 3 and v is a mapping from 2N into R+, with v (∅) = 0.6
Note that we consider only non-negative coalition worths. Since N is fixed we refer
to a game (N, v) simply as v, when no confusion can arise. Also, for players i and j,
we write v(i) instead of v({i}), v(i, j) instead of v({i, j}) etc. Coalitions of players are
subsets S, T , Q... of N . Given a vector x ∈ RN , x (S) specifies the aggregate payoﬀP
i∈S xi of coalition S ⊆ N . An allocation rule for a family of games V is a function
φ : V → RN such thatPi∈N φi(v) = v(N), i.e., it satisfies eﬃciency.
The core of a game v is the set C (v) = {x ∈ RN |x (N) = v (N) , x (S) ≥ v (S) for
all S ⊂ N }. A game v is balanced if C(v) 6= ∅, monotonic if v (S) ≤ v (S0) for all
coalitions S, S0 ⊆ N with S ⊆ S0, superadditive if v (S) + v (S0) ≤ v (S ∪ S0) for any
disjoint coalitions S, S0 ⊆ N , and convex if v (S) + v (S0) ≤ v (S ∩ S0) + v (S ∪ S0) for
all coalitions S, S0 ⊆ N . Convexity implies both superadditivity and balancedness, cf.
5Convex games hold the property that a player’s marginal contribution to a coalition (weakly)
increases as the coalition grows.
6For a general treatment of cooperative games, see, e.g., Owen (1995) or Peleg and Sudhölter (2003).
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Shapley (1971). Note also that for convex games non-negativity implies monotonicity.
Players i, j ∈ N are said to be symmetric in v if for all S ⊆ N\{i, j} it holds that
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}). An allocation rule φ is symmetric if symmetric players are
treated equally, that is, if φi(v) = φj(v) for all symmetric players i, j ∈ N in v. We say
that player i is a null player in the game v if v (S ∪ {i}) = v (S) for all S ⊆ N\ {i},
and that an allocation rule φ satisfies the null player condition (or briefly, is null) if
φi (v) = 0 whenever i is a null player.
A coalition T ⊆ N forms a partnership when each player in T commits to not
contributing to any coalition S for which T 6⊆ S. More precisely, we follow Kalai and
Samet (1987), and Carreras (1996) and say that a coalition T ⊆ N is a partnership in
v if
v(R ∪ S) = v(R) for all S ⊂ T and all R ⊆ N\T.
This definition of a partnership corresponds to the notion of a p-type coalition intro-
duced in Kalai and Samet (1987) and to what Hart and Moore (1990) call a joint
ownership, see also Carreras (1996) and Segal (2003, p. 447).7 As in Carreras (1996),
the creation of a partnership changes the game from (N, v) to
¡
N, vT
¢
defined by
vT (S) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
v (S) , if T ⊆ S
v (S\T ) , otherwise.
Notice that in the partnership game, vT , of v any coalition S ⊂ T has the same worth
as the empty coalition, i.e. vT (S) = 0. Further, all players in T are symmetric in
vT . As mentioned above, we restrict attention to the class of non-negative games. This
allows us to preserve the natural interpretation of partnership formation and disregard
situations where the formation of a partnership allows the worth of a coalition within
the partnership to increase from some negative amount to zero.
7We follow the line of literature defining a partnership as a property of a coalition with respect to
the game. In contrast, Reny et al. (2009) consider the “partnership property” which is a property of
a collection of coalitions and does not involve the game but plays a role for their study of allocations
of a game for which there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players.
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Given an allocation rule φ, it is not profitable to create any partnership if and only
if X
i∈T
φi
¡
vT
¢
≤
X
i∈T
φi (v) ,
for all T ⊆ N and all v. Allocation rules that satisfy this condition will be called
partnership formation-proof. Note that the definition implies that redistribution of the
joint profit is possible among members of a partnership. If the reverse inequality always
holds we say that the allocation rule is partnership dissolution-proof. For convenience
we use the abbreviations PFP and PDP respectively throughout this paper.
Lemma 1 below states that the partnership game inherits any properties such as
non-negativity, monotonicity, superadditivity, balancedness, and convexity from the
original game. The proofs are straightforward for non-negativity, monotonicity, and
superadditivity (as pointed out in Carreras (1996)) and are omitted here. The proofs
for the latter two properties are given.
Lemma 1 The following classes of games are closed under partnership formation.
1. Non-negative
2. Monotonic
3. Superadditive
4. Balanced
5. Convex
Proof: To show that a balanced game is closed under partnerships assume that x ∈
C (v). Note that since v(i) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N , we have C (v) ⊆ RN+ . For coalitions
S ⊆ N such that T ⊆ S or T ∩ S = ∅ we have x (S) ≥ vT (S) since vT (S) = v (S) .
For coalitions S ⊆ N such that T ∩ S 6= ∅ and T 6⊆ S, we also have x (S) ≥ vT (S)
since, if not, then x (S\T ) ≤ x (S) < vT (S) = v (S\T ) by C (v) ⊆ RN+ , contradicting
that x ∈ C (v). Thus, x ∈ C
¡
vT
¢
.
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Convex games are closed under partnerships if for any convex game v and any
T it holds that vT is convex, i.e. for any two coalitions S, S0 ⊆ N the inequality
vT (S) + vT (S0) ≤ vT (S ∪ S0) + vT (S ∩ S0) holds. If T ⊆ S and T ⊆ S0, the inequality
is immediate from the convexity of v. If T 6⊆ S and T 6⊆ S0, then
vT (S) + vT (S0) = v (S\T ) + v (S0\T )
≤ v ((S ∪ S0) \T ) + v ((S ∩ S0) \T )
≤ vT (S ∪ S0) + vT (S ∩ S0) ,
where the first inequality follows from convexity of v, and the second follows since
v ((S ∩ S0) \T ) = vT (S ∩ S0) and vT (S ∪ S0) = v((S ∪ S0)\T ) if T 6⊆ S ∪ S0 and
vT (S ∪ S0) = v(S ∪ S0) ≥ v((S ∪ S0)\T ) if T ⊆ S ∪ S0 (because by monotonicity and
convexity v is monotonic).
If T ⊆ S and T 6⊆ S0, then
vT (S) + vT (S0) = v (S) + v (S0\T )
≤ v (S ∪ S0) + v ((S ∩ S0) \T )
= vT (S ∪ S0) + vT (S ∩ S0) ,
where the inequality follows from the convexity of v. Since the remaining case T 6⊆ S
and T ⊆ S0 is symmetric, we conclude that vT is convex. ¤
3 Partnership formation- and dissolution-proofness
It is easy to construct an allocation rule that is both PFP and PDP. Consider as a
trivial example an allocation rule that always allocates the total worth of the grand
coalition to the same player, i.e., a dictatorial rule. Since the worth that is allocated to
some coalition S ⊆ N will be unchanged in any partnership game the dictatorial rule is
both PFP and PDP. There also exists a symmetric allocation rule φ that is both PFP
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and PDP: the equal-split rule φES defined by φESi (v) =
v(N)
n for all v and all i ∈ N . It
is, in fact, the only symmetric rule that is both PFP and PDP.8
Proposition 1 For any class of games that is closed under partnerships, there is one
and only one symmetric PFP and PDP allocation rule: the equal split rule.
Proof: It is clear that the equal split rule is PFP and PDP. We show that it is the only
rule that satisfies both properties. Suppose that a symmetric rule φ is PFP and PDP
and φ 6= φES. Thus there is a game v such that φ(v) 6= φES(v). Pick a player imin ∈ N
for which no other player gets a smaller payoﬀ at the allocation φ(v), and pick a player
imax ∈ N for which no other player gets a larger payoﬀ at φ(v).
First, let T = N\{imin} and consider the partnership game vT based on v. Since φ is
both PFP and PDP, we have
P
i∈T φi(v
T ) =
P
i∈T φi(v), and hence φimin(v
T ) = φimin(v).
In particular we have by symmetry that φimax(v
T ) =
?
i∈T φi(v
T )
|T | >
v(N)
|N | . Note that
vT (S) = v(S) for S = T , vT (S) = v(imin) for any coalition S 3 imin, S 6= N, and
vT (S) = 0 otherwise.
Second, let U = N\{imax} and consider the partnership game vTU based on vT .
(We write vTU rather than (vT )U to avoid cumbersome notation). Since φ is both PFP
and PDP, we have
P
i∈U φi(v
TU) =
P
i∈U φi(v
T ), and hence φimax(v
TU) = φimax(v
T ) >
φimin(v
T ). In particular by symmetry: φimin(v
TU) =
?
i∈U φi(v
TU )
|U | <
v(N)
|N | . Note that
vTU(S) = v(imin) if S = U, S 6= N and vTU(S) = 0 for all S 6= U,N .
Third, consider again the coalition T = N\{imin} and the partnership game vTUT
based on vTU . Since vTU(imin) = 0 and vTU(T ) = 0 we have vTUT (S) = 0 for all
S 6= N . In particular, the game is symmetric. But since φ is PFP and PDP we haveP
i∈T φ(v
TUT ) =
P
i∈T φ(v
TU), and hence φimin(v
TUT ) = φimin(v
TU) < v(N)|N | , contradict-
ing that φ is symmetric. ¤
The equal split rule violates the null player condition. Thus, as a consequence of
Proposition 1 we get the following negative result:
8After the initial version of this paper was submitted for publication, it has come to our attention
that a similar result has recently and independently been found by van den Brink (2009).
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Corollary 1 For no class of games that is closed under partnerships, does there exist
a symmetric allocation rule that is both PFP and PDP and satisfies the null player
condition.
It is now natural to ask whether symmetric allocation rules exist that are either
PFP or PDP while satisfying the null player condition. We get the following:
Proposition 2 i) For the class of non-negative convex games, there exist no symmetric
PFP allocation rule satisfying the null player condition. ii) There exist no symmetric
PDP allocation rule satisfying the null player condition on the class of non-negative
balanced games.
Proof: For the first part suppose that φ is a PFP allocation rule. Let n ≥ 3 and
consider the (convex) game v with v (N) = v(N \ {1}) = 1 and v (S) = 0 otherwise.
The only allocation consistent with symmetry and the null player condition is φ1(v) =
0, φi(v) =
1
n−1 for all i ∈ N \{1}. Now assume that players 1 and 2 form a partnership,
T = {1, 2}. This implies vT (N) = 1 and vT (S) = 0 otherwise. Then by symmetry
φi
¡
vT
¢
= 1n for all i ∈ N . Since φ1(v) + φ2(v) =
1
n−1 <
2
n = φ1(v
T ) + φ2(vT ) this
contradicts that φ is PFP.
For the second part, in order to provoke a counter example suppose that φ is PDP
and consider the following (balanced) game v, where n ≥ 3. v (N) = 1, v(1) = 1,
and v (S) = 0 otherwise. If T = {1, 2} form a partnership the partnership game vT
is symmetric implying that by symmetry φi(vT ) =
1
n for all i ∈ N . For φ to be PDP
it must therefore hold that φ1 (v) + φ2 (v) ≤ 2n . Next consider instead the formation
of a partnership U = {2, . . . , n}. Then vU(N) = 1, vU(S) = v(S\U) = v(1) = 1
for all S where 1 ∈ S, and v (S) = 0 otherwise, implying that all players 2,...,n are
null. Thus φ2(vU) = · · · = φn
¡
vU
¢
= 0 and for φ to be PDP it must therefore hold
that φ2(v) = · · · = φn (v) ≤ 0. Since we know that
Pn
i=1 φi (v) = 1 this implies that
φ1 (v) = 1 −(n− 1)φ2 (v). Substituting this into the condition that φ1 (v) + φ2 (v) ≤ 2n
in turn gives φ2 (v) ≥ 1n which contradicts φ2 (v) ≤ 0. ¤
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Note that for the first part where the counter example is a non-negative convex
game the result holds by implication for the classes of monotonic, superadditive, and
balanced games. Note also that the counter example used for the second part of Prop.
2 is not a monotonic game. This is no coincidence as monotonicity does allow for a
symmetric PDP rule that satisfies the null player condition:
Proposition 3 There exist a symmetric PDP allocation rule satisfying the null player
condition on the class of monotonic games. Indeed, the equal non-null split rule (which
divides v(N) equally between all non-null players in N) satisfies PDP.
Proof: For a game v, let D(v) ⊆ N denote the set of null players i in N. Let φ∗ be
the rule that gives 0 to the null players and then divides v(N) equally between the
remaining players in N ; i.e. φ∗i (v) = 0 if i ∈ D(v) and φ∗i (v) = v(N)|N\D(v)| otherwise.
Clearly, φ∗ is a symmetric rule satisfying the null player condition. We now show that
φ∗ satisfies the PDP property.
For this, consider a game v and suppose that the players in T ⊆ N form a partner-
ship. We now claim that (i) for all i 6∈ T we have i ∈ D(v) implies i ∈ D(vT ), and (ii)
for all i ∈ T we have i 6∈ D(v) implies i 6∈ D(vT ).
Ad (i). Let i ∈ D(v)\T. Let S ⊆ N be an arbitrary coalition with i /∈ S. If
S ∩ T = ∅ or T ⊆ S we have vT (S) = v(S) and vT (S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {i}), and
thus vT (S ∪ {i}) − vT (S) = v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) = 0. If T * S and S ∩ T 6= ∅ then
vT (S) = v(S\T ) and vT (S∪{i}) = v((S\T )∪{i}), and thus have vT (S∪{i})−vT (S) =
v((S\T ) ∪ {i})− v(S\T ) = 0. Thus, i ∈ D(vT ).
Ad (ii). Let i ∈ T\D(v). Since i is not a null player and the game v is monotonic,
there is a coalition S ⊆ N with i /∈ S where v(S∪{i})−v(S) > 0. In particular, we have
vT ((S ∪ T )\{i}) = v(S\T ) ≤ v(S), and vT (S ∪ T ) = v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S ∪ {i}) where the
inequalities follow by monotonicity of v. We therefore get vT (S∪T )−vT ((S∪T )\{i}) ≥
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) > 0. Thus, i /∈ D(vT ).
If v(N) > 0 we have N\D(v) 6= ∅ and since vT (N) = v(N) we get N\D(vT ) 6= ∅.
In particular, it follows by (i) and (ii) that |T\D(v)||N\D(v)| ≤
|T\D(vT )|
|N\D(vT )| . Thus,
P
i∈T
φ∗i (vT ) =
11
|T\D(vT )|
|N\D(vT )|v
T (N) ≥ |T\D(v)||N\D(v)|v(N) =
P
i∈T
φ∗i (v)which shows that φ
∗ is PDP. ¤
Proposition 2 ii) implies that there exists no symmetric PDP allocation rule sat-
isfying the null player condition on the family of non-negative games. In fact, PDP
allocation rules cannot be found on this family of games even if the symmetry require-
ment is dropped.
Proposition 4 There exist no PDP allocation rules satisfying the null player condition
on the class of non-negative games.
Proof: In order to provoke a counter example, suppose that φ is PDP and consider
the game v defined by n ≥ 3, v (N) = 1, v(i) = 1 for all i, v (S) = 0 otherwise.
There must exist some two player combination {i, j} for which φi (v) + φj (v) > 0.
Then, if T = {i, j} forms a partnership they become null players in vT with payoﬀ
φi(vT ) = φj(vT ) = 0 contradicting that φ is PDP. ¤
4 The Shapley value and other core allocation rules
An allocation rule φ defined on the family of balanced games is a core allocation rule if
φ(v) ∈ C (v) for all balanced v. Note that all core allocation rules satisfy the null player
condition. It turns out that the positive result from Prop. 3 cannot be strengthened to
the case of core allocation rules, at least if n ≥ 6.
Proposition 5 For n ≥ 6, there exists no symmetric PDP core allocation rule on the
class of monotonic balanced games.
Proof: Suppose that φ is a PDP symmetric core allocation rule. Let n = 6 and define a
(monotonic balanced) game v as follows: v(i) = 0 for all i, v(1, 2) = v(1, 3) = v(2, 3) =
v(1, 2, 3) = v(4, 5, 6) = 2, v(S) = 2 if S contains at least two players in {1, 2, 3} but
not coalition {4, 5, 6} or if S contains coalition {4, 5, 6} but no more than one of the
players in {1, 2, 3}, v(S) = 4 if S contains {4, 5, 6} and at least one of the coalitions
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, v(N) = 5 and otherwise v(S) = 0. Then C(v) only contains
12
one symmetric element and we must have φ(v) = {1, 1, 1, 2
3
, 2
3
, 2
3
}. Let T = {1, 2, 3}.
Then vT (S) = 0 if |S| ≤ 2, vT (S) = 2 if contains either {1, 2, 3} or {4, 5, 6} but not
both of them. By symmetry, we have φ{1,2,3}(vT ) = φ{4,5,6}(vT ) =
5
2
< φ{1,2,3}(v) = 3
contradicting that φ is PDP.
Finally, we note that since φ is a core allocation rule it satisfies the null player
condition. Hence we can extend the counter example to any n > 6 by adding null
players. ¤
As stated in Prop. 5 it is not possible to find symmetric PDP core allocation rules
on the family of monotonic balanced games. It is, however, possible to find symmetric
PDP core allocation rules on the family of convex games. Segal (2003) gives a condition
for a partnership to always be (weakly) (un)profitable when a game is solved by a
probabilistic value. It can be inferred from his analysis that partnerships are always
(weakly) profitable in convex games. We give a short and illustrative proof for the case
of the Shapley value. The Shapley value, which is a symmetric probabilistic value, is
defined as
φShi (N, v) =
X
S⊆N,S3i
p(S)(v(S)− v(S\{i})),
where p(S) = (|S|−1)!(|N |−|S|)!|N |! , cf. Shapley (1953).
Proposition 6 The Shapley value (which is indeed a core allocation rule on convex
games) is a symmetric PDP core allocation rule on the class of non-negative convex
games.
Proof: For any n ≥ 3 and i 6∈ T , we have
φShi
¡
vT
¢
=
X
S⊆N,i∈S
p (S)
£
vT (S)− vT (S\ {i})¤
=
X
S⊆N,i∈S,
T⊆S
p (S) [v (S)− v (S\ {i})] +
X
S⊆N,i∈S,
T∩S=∅
p (S) [v (S)− v (S\ {i})] +
X
S⊆N,i∈S,
T∩S 6=∅,T*S
p (S) [v (S\T )− v (S\ (T ∪ {i}))] .
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The value for player i 6∈ T in the games v and vT respectively will only diﬀer in the last
term. That is,
φShi
¡
vT
¢
− φShi (v)=
X
S⊆N,i∈S,
T∩S 6=∅,
T*S
p (S) [v (S\T )− v (S\ (T ∪{i}))− (v (S)− v (S\ {i}))] .
By convexity of v we have v (S\T ) − v (S\ (T ∪ {i})) ≤ v (S) − v (S\ {i}) implying
φShi
¡
vT
¢
−φShi (v) ≤ 0 for all i 6∈ T and thus by eﬃciency
P
i∈T φ
Sh
i
¡
vT
¢
≥
P
i∈T φ
Sh
i (v).
Furthermore, in the case of strict convexity we have
P
i∈T φ
Sh
i
¡
vT
¢
>
P
i∈T φ
Sh
i (v) . ¤
As a corollary of Prop. 6 and Lemma 1 it can be noted that when the Shapley value
is applied to strictly convex games some set of players can jointly profit from forming
a partnership as long as the game is not symmetric in which case further partnership
formation has no eﬀect.
The Shapley value was shown to be a PDP core allocation rule on convex games,
however, other well-known symmetric core allocation rules do not share this property
as will be shown below.
Fujishige (1980) and Dutta and Ray (1989) and numerous subsequent papers have
analyzed the allocation rule that for any convex game selects the unique most egalitarian
allocation in the core. This rule will be denoted the Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule,
φFDR, in the following. The algorithm resulting in φFDR in a convex game partitions
the set of players N in a game (N, v) into subsets S1, S2, ..., Sm, where S1 is the (unique)
largest coalition having the highest average worth in (N, v). For any coalition S and any
characteristic function v the average worth of S under v is defined by e(S, v) = v(S)/|S|.
For k = 2, ...,m, Sk is the unique largest coalition with the highest average worth in
the game (Nk, vk) with player set Nk = N\{S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk−1}, given that the worth of
a coalition S in any game (Nk, vk) is defined as vk(S) = vk−1(Sk−1 ∪ S) − vk−1(Sk−1),
where v1 = v, see Dutta and Ray (1989). Then the amount allocated to a player i
according to φFDR equals φFDRi = e(Sk, vk) for all i ∈ Sk. In convex games φFDR is the
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unique egalitarian allocation and belongs to the core.
Another well-known allocation rule with favorable properties on the class of convex
games is the nucleolus introduced by Schmeidler (1969). The nucleolus is the allocation
rule φnu that assigns an allocation x = φnu(v) to each game v such that x lexicographi-
cally minimizes the vector of excesses e(S, x) = v(S)−
P
i∈S xi. The nucleolus is unique
and is in the core whenever the core is non-empty.9
While it follows from Prop. 2 i) that none of the above-mentioned core allocation
rules are PFP on convex games, it can be shown by way of simple counter examples
that neither the Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule nor the nucleolus is PDP on the
class of convex games.
Proposition 7 Neither the Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule nor the nucleolus is
PDP on the class of non-negative convex games.
Proof: For n = 3 consider a game v defined by v(N) = 2, v(1) = 1, v(1, 2) = v(1, 3) =
1 and v(S) = 0 otherwise. Then φFDR(v) =
¡
1, 1
2
, 1
2
¢
and φnu(v) =
¡
4
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
¢
. If
a partnership is formed between players 1 and 2 the game changes to vT (N) = 2,
vT (1, 2) = 1, and v(S) = 0 otherwise. This implies φFDR(vT ) =
¡
2
3
, 2
3
, 2
3
¢
, which shows
that φFDR cannot be PDP since φFDR1 (v) +φ
FDR
2 (v) =
3
2
> 4
3
= φFDR1 (vT ) + φ
FDR
2 (vT ).
Likewise we get that φnu(vT ) =
¡
3
4
, 3
4
, 1
2
¢
from which we conclude that φnu cannot be
PDP since φnu(v) + φnu(v) = 5
3
> 3
2
= φnu(vT ) + φnu(vT ).
Since the FDR allocation rule as well as the nucleolus satisfy the null player condition
similar counterexamples can be constructed for n > 3 by adding null players to the
game. ¤
9It has been shown by Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1971) that the nucleolus coincides with the
prekernel on the domain of convex games.
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5 Weak partnership formation- and dissolution-
proofness
The definition of PFP and PDP applied in sections 3 and 4 holds an implicit assumption
of the ability of members in a partnership to redistribute the joint profit. An obvious
alternative to this definition is to consider a deviation to be profitable only if it is
individually profitable for every member of a partnership in question. Thus, we define
an allocation rule φ to be weakly partnership formation-proof (WPFP) if and only if
for any game v and any nonempty T ⊆ N there exists i ∈ T such that φTi (v) ≤ φi(v).
Likewise, an allocation rule φ is said to be weakly partnership dissolution-proof (WPDP)
if and only if for any game v and any nonempty T ⊆ N there exists i ∈ T such that
φTi (v) ≥ φi(v). In the following we reconsider some of the previous results in light of
these alternative definitions.
We consider again the equal non-null split rule φ∗ and show that it is both WPFP
and WPDP on the class of non-negative convex games. This finding contrasts Prop. 1.
Proposition 8 i) The equal non-null split rule φ∗ is both WPDP and WPFP on the
class of non-negative convex games, however, ii) There exists no symmetric WPFP rule
satisfying the null player condition on the class of monotonic games.
Proof: For the first part: As in the proof of Proposition 3, let D(v) denote the set of
null players in v and let φ∗i (v) = 0 if i ∈ D(v) and φ∗i (v) =
v(N)
|N\D(v)| otherwise. Note
that since v is convex, i ∈ N\D(v) if and only if v(N)− v(N\{i}) > 0. Consequently,
for any partnership such that T ⊆ N\D(v), it follows that ¯¯N\D(vT )¯¯ = |N\D(v)| and
the allocation remains unchanged, i.e. no one can profit from this type of deviation.
However, for any partnership T such that T 6⊆ N\D(v) we get ¯¯N\D(vT )¯¯ > |N\D(v)|
and φ∗i (N, vT ) < φ
∗
i (N, v) for all i ∈ N\D(v), implying that forming a partnership can
never be strictly profitable for each player in T . Thus, the allocation rule is WPFP.
On the other hand, when T 6⊆ N\D(v) and ¯¯N\D(vT )¯¯ > |N\D(v)| then for those
i 6∈ N\D(v) but in T (and thus in N\D(vT )) we have that φ∗i (v) = 0 < v(N)|N\D(vT )| =
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φ∗i (N, vT ). Since these players will prefer to keep the partnership intact the allocation
rule will also be WPDP.
For the second part, let N = {1, ..., n} and consider the (monotonic) game v where
v(S) = 0 if |S| = 1 and v(S) = 1 otherwise (such that v(i, j)− v(i) = 1 for j 6= i and
v(S) − v(S\{i}) = 0 otherwise). Let φ be a symmetric rule satisfying the null player
condition. Then φi(v) =
1
n for all i ∈ N . Now, let T = {1, ..., n−1} form a partnership.
Then, vT (T ) = vT (N) = 1 and and vT (S) = 0 otherwise. Since player n is a null player
in vT by symmetry we get φi(vT ) =
1
n−1 for all i ∈ T , contradicting WPFP. ¤
From Prop. 3 we know that the equal non-null split rule (which is a a symmetric
rule satisfying the null player condition) is also WPDP on the class of monotonic games.
Further, the result from Prop. 5 holds also for the case of WPDP, that is, there exists
no symmetric WPDP core allocation rule on the family of monotonic balanced games.
To see this note that in the example given in the proof of Prop. 5, every player in the
partnership is strictly better oﬀ by dissolving the partnership, implying that no WPDP
allocation rule can be found.
Reconsidering the allocation rules from the previous section we notice first that
since the Shapley value is PDP it is also WPDP, but as shown below it is not WPFP.
However, the FDR-allocation rule is WPFP. Recall that on convex games the allocation
rule φFDR satisfies the properties that φFDRi = φ
FDR
j for all i, j ∈ St and t = 1, ..,m
and that φFDRi > φ
FDR
j if i ∈ Sk, j ∈ St and k < t, cf. Dutta and Ray (1989).
Proposition 9 i) the FDR-allocation rule (which is indeed a symmetric allocation rule
satisfying the null player condition) is WPFP on the class of non-negative convex games,
however, ii) Neither the Shapley value nor the nucleolus is WPFP on non-negative
convex games.
Proof: For the first part consider a game (N, v) and let N be partitioned into subsets
S1, ..., Sm according to the description of the FDR-allocation rule in the previous section.
Then i ∈ S1 belongs to the coalition with the highest average worth and φFDRi (vB) =
vB(S1)/|S1|. Since creating a partnership will not strictly increase the payoﬀ of a
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coalition but may decrease the payoﬀ of certain coalitions, players in S1 can never
strictly profit from joining a partnership. Since no player belonging to S1 will form
a partnership with players outside S1 and no partnership among players in N\S1 can
aﬀect vB(S1), each player in of S1 is secured the payoﬀ vB(S1)/|S1|.
The algorithm first allocates the worth to S1 and then considers the set of remaining
players N\S1. Thus within the player set N\S1 the players in S2 will be allocated the
greatest worth among the remaining coalitions. Given this, the players of S2 could
never (strictly) profit from joining a partnership among the remaining players. This
reasoning can be applied to any Sk , k = 1, ..,m, in the partitioning of N . Since this
holds for any v it can be concluded that the FDR-allocation rule is WPFP.
For the second part: consider the (convex) game v defined by n = 3, v(N) =
3, v(1) = 1, v(2) = v(3) = 0, v(1, 2) = v(1, 3) = 2 and v(2, 3) = 1. Then φSh(v) =
φnu(v) =
¡
5
3
, 2
3
, 2
3
¢
. If a partnership is formed between players 2 and 3 the game changes
to v(N) = 3, v(1) = 1, v(2) = v(3) = 0, v(1, 2) = v(1, 3) = v(2, 3) = 1. This implies
φSh(vT ) =
¡
4
3
, 5
6
, 5
6
¢
, which shows that φSh cannot be WPFP since φSh2 (v) = φ
Sh
3 (v) =
2
3
< 5
6
= φSh1 (vT ) = φ
Sh
2 (vT ). Likewise we get that φ
nu(vT ) =
¡
6
4
, 3
4
, 3
4
¢
from which
we conclude that φnu cannot be WPFP since φnu(v) = φnu(v) = 2
3
< 3
4
= φnu(vT ) =
φnu(vT ). Again similar examples can be constructed for n > 3 by adding null players
to the game. ¤
Since the FDR rule satisfies symmetry and the null player condition it shows that
Prop. 2 i) does not hold for the case of WPFP.
6 Stability of partnership structures
Until now we have considered the existence of PFP and/or PDP allocation rules on
specific classes of games as well as the properties of certain allocation rules. In this
context we considered the decision of a group of players to form or dissolve a given
partnership. However, given a population where several disjoint partnerships may exist
a related problem would be to consider the incentives of any group of players (from the
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same or from diﬀerent partnerships) to form a new partnership, possibly breaking up
others in the process. In other words we could consider the incentives of any group of
players to change the partnership structure.
Consider a game v. Define any partition B = {T1, T2, ..., Tm} of N as a partnership
structure withm partnerships and note that now we consider an element of B with only
one member a partnership. The game vB is then defined by vB = (...(vT1)T2)...)Tm and
the worth of a coalition S is vB(S) = v(
S
Tj⊆S Tj).
10 Given a game v and an allocation
rule φ we say that a partnership structure B is stable, if no set of players can profitably
leave their respective partnerships and form new (possibly trivial) partnerships. In
this context a change from one partnership structure (B) to another (B0) is considered
profitable for a set of players S if the payoﬀ allocated to each player in the set is strictly
larger under the new partnership structure, that is, if φi(vB
0
) > φi(vB) for all i ∈ S.
Alternatively, one could apply a stronger notion of stability by considering a change of
partnership structure to be profitable for a set of players S whenever the total worth
allocated to S is greater under B0 than B. While the latter definition is in accordance
with the analysis of sections 3 and 4, in this section we nevertheless choose to consider
its weaker counterpart discussed in the previous section. First, this is the definition
applied in other papers where the stability of partnership structures — or alternatively,
coalition structures — have been analyzed, see e.g., Hart and Kurz (1983, 1984) and
Segal (2003).11 Second, while the previous analysis concerned only the group decision
of whether or not to form a partnership in a given game, the approach taken in the
present section also considers an individual’s incentives to leave an existing partnership
and possibly join another. Concerning such decisions the strong version of stability
may not be a satisfactory concept as the following example demonstrates.
Consider the game (N, v) defined by N = {1, 2, 3}, v(N) = 4, v(1, 2) = 3 and
10This definition is applicable also to the case where diﬀerent partnerships do not necessarily consist
of disjoint sets of players. As noted in Carreras (1996), the formation order of the partnerships does
not matter.
11What we in the present paper have denoted “a partnership” is in the terminology of Segal (2003)
referred to as a special case of “exclusion” or “exclusive integration”.
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v(S) = 0 otherwise. Note that for the trivial partnership structure B = {{1}, {2}, {3}}
we have that
¡
N, vB
¢
= (N, v). In this game the FDR allocation becomes φFDR(vB) =
(3
2
, 3
2
, 1). If a partnership T = {1, 3} is created the partnership structure changes to
B0 = {{1, 3}, {2}} and the game ¡N, vB0¢ is defined by vB0(N) = 4 and vB0(S) = 0
otherwise, implying that φFDR(vB0) = (4
3
, 4
3
, 4
3
). Since the change from B to B0 is jointly
profitable for the players in the partnership the trivial partnership structure cannot
be (strongly) stable. However, since φFDR1 (vB
0
) = 4
3
< 3
2
= φFDR1 (vB) player 1 as an
individual was strictly better oﬀ under B and will therefore have incentives to leave the
partnership he just joined. The problem is that when considering the strong version
of stability we allow a player to form a partnership even if he is individually worse
oﬀ assuming that other members of the partnership will be able to compensate him
for joining. However, when considering his decision to leave the partnership we only
evaluate the payoﬀ allocated to this player individually according to the allocation rule
and thus fail to take the possible compensation oﬀered by other partnership members
into account (i.e., the redistribution of the joint profit). To avoid this problem we
hereafter only consider the weaker notion of stability.
The definition of stability of partnership structures may also depend on what hap-
pens when one player (or more) leaves a partnership that is, whether the entire part-
nership breaks down or a partnership continues to exist among the remaining partners.
In Hart and Kurz (1983) this question leads to the definition of two distinct types of
stability. For the extent of this paper we assume that in the case of some member(s)
leaving a partnership the remaining members will continue to cooperate. The following
results, however, apply to both settings.
Considering the stability of partnership structures a relevant question is whether a
stable partnership structure always exists when employing a specific allocation rule. We
find that for the case of the Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule a stable partnership
structure does always exist. In fact when using the FDR allocation rule the trivial
partnership structure is always stable for convex games.
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Corollary 2 For the class of non-negative convex games the trivial partnership struc-
ture consisting of singletons is stable for any game (N, v) when the Fujishige-Dutta-Ray
allocation rule is applied.
Proof: This follows directly from Prop. 8 i). ¤
For both the Shapley value and the nucleolus examples of games where stable part-
nership structures exist can be found. Consider e.g. the example from Prop. 9 ii). Here
the partnership structure TB = {{1}, {2, 3}} is stable whether the allocation is done by
the Shapley value or the nucleolus.12
However, for the Shapley value as well as the nucleolus there exist games for any
n ≥ 3 such that no stable partnership structure exist as shown below.
Proposition 10 For any n ≥ 3, there exist non-negative convex games such that no
stable partnership structure exists when the Shapley value φSh is applied.
Proof: For any given n ≥ 3, let the convex game v be defined as follows: v(N) = 2,
v(N\{i}) = 1 for all i 6= 1 and v(S) = 0 otherwise. Further, for any partnership
structure B = {T1, T2, ..., Tm} let TB denote the set that is the union of player 1 and
all players in some Ti that is not a singleton. Then it holds for all i ∈ TB that
vB(N\{i}) = 0.
Recalling the definition of the Shapley value and noting the structure of the game
v, it is seen that the allocation to player i will equal
φShi (v) =
1
n
(v(N)− v(N\{i}) +
X
S3i,|S|=n−1
1
n(n− 1)(v(S)− v(S\{i})). (1)
This implies that the worth allocated to player i according to the Shapley value and a
partnership structure B will be: φShi (vB) = 1n ∗ 2 + 1n(n−1)
¡
n− |TB|¢ for i ∈ TB and
φShi (vB) =
1
n +
1
n(n−1)
¡
n− |TB|− 1¢ for i 6∈ TB, where the first term in each expression
reflects the contribution made to the grand coalition and the second term reflects the
contribution made to coalitions of size n− 1.
12To see this note that for TB = {{1, 2}, 3} we get φShi (v) = ( 43 , 43 , 13) and φShi (v) = ( 54 , 54 , 12 )
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Now consider any i 6∈ TB and let B0 denote some partnership structure such that i ∈
TB0 (i.e., where i belongs to a non-trivial partnership). Then a change in the partnership
structure from B to B0 would induce the following change in the Shapley value of player
i: ∆φShi (vB
0 , vB) = φShi (vB
0
) − φShi (vB) = 1n − ((|TB
0| − |TB|) − 1) 1n(n−1) > 0, where
(|TB0|− |TB|) reflects the change in the number of players belonging to a partnership.
The change ∆φShi (vB
0 , vB) will always be positive (since |TB0| − |TB| ≤ n − 1), and a
player currently not in a partnership will therefore always have incentives to join one.
Thus, if at least two players (other than player 1) are not in a (non-trivial) partnership
they have incentives to form one.
On the other hand any player i ∈ TB, TB0 is negatively aﬀected when more play-
ers join partnerships. To see this note that in this case ∆φShi (vB
0 , vB) = −(|TB0| −
|TB|)) 1n(n−1) is negative whenever |TB
0| > |TB|. A player in TB will therefore always
prefer that fewer players belong to non-trivial partnerships. This can be interpreted as
an incentive to exclude other players from partnerships or break up existing partner-
ships and form new and smaller ones. Therefore, if partnerships with more than two
players exists, there will always be incentives to exclude one player.13 If partnerships
with two players (other than player 1) exist, each member has incentives to break up
the partnership and join a partnership with player 1, thereby excluding their former
partner. However, if player 1 is in a two-player partnership he will have incentives to
dissolve it. ¤
Since the result shows non-existence of stability in the weak sense it also applies to
the case where the stronger version of stability is invoked.
Proposition 11 For any n ≥ 3, there exist non-negative convex games such that no
stable partnership structure exists when the nucleolus φnu is applied.
Proof: For any given n ≥ 3, let the convex game v be defined as follows: v(N) = 2,
v(N\{i}) = nn+2v(N) = 2nn+2 for all i 6= 1 and v(S) = 0 otherwise. As in the proof
13If remaining members were assumed to split up when some players leave a partnership (opposed
to what is assumed here) there would be incentives to exclude more than one player.
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of Proposition 10 for any partnership structure B = {T1, T2, ..., Tm} let TB denote the
union of player 1 and the set of all players in some Ti that is not a singleton. Then for
any n and any B the allocation according to the nucleolus will be:
φnu(vB) =
2− 2nn+2
|TB| +
2
n+ 2
for all i ∈ TB, and (2)
φnu(vB) =
2
n+ 2
for all i /∈ TB. (3)
First, to show this is true let
eij = max
S
i∈S
j /∈S
(v(S)−
X
i∈S
xi)
be the maximum excess over coalitions that contain i but not j where x is the vector
of allocations. Then since the nucleolus coincides with the prekernel on the domain of
convex games it suﬃces to show that eij = eji for all i, j with i 6= j, cf. Maschler, Peleg
and Shapley (1971).
For any i /∈ TB it holds that v(i)−xi = − 2n+2 while v(i)−xi < −
2
n+2 for all i ∈ TB.
Further, for all larger coalitions S where v(S) = 0 the excess must be even smaller.
Thus the only coalitions left to consider are those coalitions where v(S) > 0. For all
coalitions S = N \ {i} where i /∈ TB we get:
v(S)−
X
i∈S
xi =
2n
n+ 2
−
µ
2− 2n
n+ 2
+ |TB| 2
n+ 2
+ (n− |TB|− 1) 2
n+ 2
¶
= − 2
n+ 2
.
Since all players in TB are symmetric and all players not in TB are symmetric we
conclude that eij = eji for all i, j, i 6= j. Specifically for any i /∈ TB, j ∈ N, j 6= i we
have eij = − 2n+2 and for i ∈ TB, j /∈ TB we have eij = −
2
n+2 while eij = −φ
nu(vB) for
all i ∈ TB, j ∈ TB, j 6= i. The above allocation therefore equals the nucleolus.
Now, since the worth allocated to a player in TB always exceeds the worth allocated
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to players not in TB (no matter the number of players in TB) any two players not in
a partnership will always have incentives to form one. On the other hand, considering
two diﬀerent partnership structures TB, TB0 where |TB0| > |TB| it is seen that for a
player i ∈ TB, TB0 we have φnu(vB0) < φnu(vB). Therefore, if partnerships with more
than two players exists, there will always be incentives for the members to exclude one
player.14 If partnerships with two players (other than player 1) exist, each member has
incentives to break up the partnership and join a partnership with player 1 to exclude
their former partner. However, if player 1 is in a two-player partnership he will have
incentives to dissolve it. ¤
7 Concluding remarks
For several classes of games we have considered the existence of partnership formation-
proof and partnership dissolution-proof allocation rules. Such allocation rules will be
immune to manipulation by players forming or dissolving partnerships. We showed
that if allocations rules must satisfy symmetry and the null player condition then for
some classes of games neither partnership formation-proof nor partnership dissolution-
proof allocation rules exist, while dissolution-proof allocation rules that satisfy these
properties do exist for other classes of games.
We considered in particular three well-known allocation rules; the Shapley value,
the nucleolus and the Fujishige-Dutta-Ray rule. The first two are classical solution
concepts that are widely used and studied in the literature while especially in recent
years the egalitarian FDR-rule has attracted considerable attention.
We have focused here on non-negative games that are either convex or satisfy milder
regularity conditions such a monotonicity, superadditivity and balancedness. Impor-
tant cooperative decision problems, such a classes of common pool games, oligopoly
games, production games and cost sharing situations, are indeed both non-negative
14If remaining members were assumed to split up when some players leave a partnership (opposed
to what is assumed here) there would be incentives to exclude more than one player.
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and convex15. Thus, many cooperative game situations fall within the classes of games
considered here.
When considering the incentives of players to form partnerships, a key distinction
is whether partnerships are likely to form when every individual member is better
oﬀ or simply when members are jointly better oﬀ. This leads to our distinction be-
tween partnership formation/dissolution-proofness and the weak versions of the con-
cepts. The appropriate concept depends on assumptions of redistribution possibilities
between members. These may vary greatly between diﬀerent game situations and with
the nature of the payoﬀ (e.g. money, publicity, seats in a parliament, individual util-
ity). For instance, if partnerships involve private firms establishing joint ownerships,
or a couple getting married, redistribution between the partners is likely to take place
unhindered. In contrast, in games when players are for example diﬀerent regions in
a country or diﬀerent departments of a public institution, allocations are likely to be
determined by a fixed rule and the possibilities for internal redistributions between
players severely limited.
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